We analyze a rationale for official authorization of patient dumping in the prospective payment policy framework. We show that when the insurer designs the healthcare payment policy to let hospitals dump high-cost patients, there is a trade-off between the disutility of dumped patients (changes...

We investigate the properties of health insurance demand in Burkina Faso, where we offered poor households a voluntary health insurance product at half the usual price. The targeting procedure we implemented delivers a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, which identifies the price elasticity...

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) changed incentives for individual and employer-sponsored insurance. Using unique small group market (SGM) data with detailed claims and enrollment information, we analyze the welfare gains across households in the SGM from alternative formulations of ACA health...

A common approach to markets with adverse selection is to regulate competition to minimize inefficiencies, while preserving consumer choice among firms. We study the role of procurement auctions--leading to sole provision by the winning firm--as an alternative market design. Relative to...

Adverse selection in insurance markets may lead some consumers to underinsure or too few consumers to purchase insurance relative to the socially optimal level. I study whether government intervention can mitigate both underinsurance and underenrollment due to adverse selection. I establish...

We study how increasing contract length affects adverse selection in health insurance markets. Although health risks are persistent, private health insurance contracts in the United States have short, one-year terms. Short-term, community-rated contracts allow patients to increase their coverage...

Starting from December 2012, insurers in the European Union were prohibited from charging gender-discriminatory prices. We examine the effect of this unisex mandate on risk segmentation in the German health insurance market. While gender used to be a pricing factor in Germany's private health...

This paper studies general health insurance markets. It proposes an ex post risk adjustment scheme that discourages risk selection and promotes efficient competition. Under the proposed risk adjustment scheme, the regulator engages in transfers that are conditional on the ex post profits of...

We present robust evidence on the presence of adverse selection in hospitalization insurance for low-income households. A large randomized control trial from Pakistan allows us to separate adverse selection from moral hazard, to estimate how selection changes at different points of the demand...

Evidence of adverse selection in insurance markets is well-documented in the literature. Recent healthcare reform in the United States imposed substantial changes to health insurer operations, including rating restrictions. We provide evidence of the presence of adverse selection following the...