The existing literature on two-sided markets addresses participation externalities, but so far it has neglected pecuniary externalities between competing platforms. In this paper we build a model that incorporates both externalities. In our setup differentiated platforms compete in advertising...

The existing literature on "two-sided markets" addresses participation externalities, but so far it has neglected pecuniary externalities between competing platforms. In this paper we build a model that incorporates both externalities. In our setup differentiated platforms compete in advertising...

This paper develops a fairly general model of platform competition in media markets allowing viewers to use multiple platforms. This leads to a new form of competition between platforms, in which they do not steal viewers from each other, but affect the viewer composition and thereby the...

We survey the economics literature on media as it applies to the Internet. The Internet is an important driver behind media convergence and connects information and communication technologies. While new Internet media share some properties with traditional media, several novel features have...

This paper analyzes a two-sided market model in which platforms compete for advertisers and users. Platforms are differentiated from the users' perspective but are homogenous for advertisers. We show that, although there is Bertrand competition for advertisers, platforms obtain positive margins...

We consider a market with two symmetric firms and two asymmetric consumer groups. Firms send advertising messages which inform consumers about the existence and the price of their product (Butters, 1977). Targeting a specific consumer is imperfect as with some probability the consumer is not...

We survey the economics literature on media as it applies to the Internet. The Internet is an important driver behind media convergence and connects information and communication technologies. While new Internet media share some properties with traditional media, several novel features have...

This paper analyzes a two-sided market model in which platforms compete for advertisers and users. Platforms are differentiated from the users' perspective but are homogenous for advertisers. I show that, although there is Bertrand competition for advertisers, platforms obtain positive margins...