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Injunctions against false advertising
Baumann, Florian; Rasch, Alexander - 2019
false advertising by a firm in duopolistic competition where consumers can be distinguished according to whether or not they … form rational beliefs about the trustworthiness of advertising claims. We compare private and public law enforcement in the … form of the demand for injunctions against false advertising. From a welfare perspective, we show that it can be optimal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012012317
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Deceptive advertising with rational buyers
Piccolo, Salvatore; Tedeschi, Piero; Ursino, Giovanni - 2015
buyer into a bad purchase through (costly) deceptive advertising. We characterize the equilibrium set of the game and argue …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011774615
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Signaling Quality through Prices in an Oligopoly
Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Roy, Santanu - 2007
Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325591
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Horizontal mergers and product quality
Brekke, Kurt R.; Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd Rune - 2015
We study the effects of horizontal mergers when firms compete on quality and price. Two key factors are identified: (i) the magnitude of variable quality costs, and (ii) the relative magnitudes of cross-quality and cross-price effects on demand. The merging firms will increase (reduce) both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011283834
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Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly
Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Roy, Santanu - 2007
Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372971
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Oligopolistic competition in price and quality
Dubovik, Andrei; Janssen, Maarten C. W. - 2008
We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers are heterogeneous in knowledge: some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered, some know only the prices and some know neither. We show that two types of signalling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376636
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Competitive market segmentation
Sticher, Silvio - 2013
In a two-firm model where each firm sells a high-quality and a low-quality version of a product, customers differ with respect to their brand preferences and their attitudes towards quality. We show that the standard result of quality-independent markups crucially depends on the assumption that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227304
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Targeted pricing, consumer myopia and investment in customer-tracking technology
Baye, Irina; Sapi, Geza - 2014
We analyze how consumer myopia influences investment incentives into a technology that enables firms to track consumers' purchases and make targeted offers based on their preferences. In a two-period Hotelling setup firms may invest in customer-tracking technology. If a firm acquires the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010246774
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Consumer flexibility, data quality and targeted pricing
Sapi, Geza; Suleymanova, Irina - 2013
We investigate how firms' incentives to acquire customer data for targeted offers depend on its quality. A two-dimensional Hotelling model is proposed where consumers are heterogeneous both with respect to their locations and transportation cost parameters (flexibility). Firms have perfect data...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010204781
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A note on consumer flexibility, data quality and collusion
Hasnas, Irina - 2014
In this note we analyze the sustainability of collusion in a game of repeated interaction where firms can price discriminate among consumers based on two types of customer data. This work is related to Liu and Serfes (2007) and Sapi and Suleymanova (2013). Following Sapi and Suleymanova we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343547