We analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral-hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however,...

This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By...

High Performance Work Systems are generally considered to have a positive impact on workers' well-being. But is this actually the case? This article will discuss this question from the point of view of "End of Fun", a controversial and widely-discussed book by Judith Mair (2003), claiming that...

We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages, e.g., minimum wages or liability limits, on job design within firms. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-veriable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. In the absence...

In this paper, a principal's decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It...

Mit der Einführung der Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende im Jahr 2005 wurde in Deutschland ein System von Sanktionen implementiert, das für Arbeitslosengeld(ALG)-II-Bezieher im Alter von unter 25 Jahren besonders starke Leistungsminderungen nach sich ziehen kann. In unserem...

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

This conceptual article examines how Sustainable Human Resource Management (Sustainable HRM) can help establishing an attractive employer brand that can address the different needs and expectations of potential and existing employees, without compromising a consistent employer image, which can...

Traditionally, researchers have had difficulty testing the relationship between the degree of risk or uncertainty in workers' environments and incentive pay. The authors employ Prendergast's (2002) theory that incorporates the delegation of worker authority into the principal-agent model to...