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In this paper we examine a representative agent forecasting prices in a first-order self-referential overlapping generations model. We first consider intermediate stage learning, where agents update the forecasting rule every periods. We show that, in theory and simulations, the learning rule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195723
Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, butrecipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complexfeatures. We study a model of competitive information disclosure by two senders, inwhich the receiver may garble each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848500
This paper investigates a dynamic agency problem that includes the AI-style agent and principal. We develop a quantitative bionic approach to dynamic contracting based on calibrating the incentive properties of a workhorse contracts model in which self-awareness and memory are endowed. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014081184
We study the effects of overconfidence in a two-period investment-decision agency setting. Under common priors, agent risk aversion implies inefficiently low first-period investment. In our model, principal and agent disagree about the profitability of the investment decision conditional on a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003751219
Several economists have directed our attention to a finding in the social psychological literature that extrinsic motivation may undermine intrinsic motivation. The self-perception (SP) theory developed by Bem (1972) explains this finding. The crux of this theory is that people remember their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349711
We analyze a repeated principal-agent setting in which the principal cares about the agent's verifiable effort as well as an extra profit that can be generated only if the agent is talented. The agent is overconfident about his talent and updates beliefs using Bayes' rule. An exploitation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014292070
We analyze a repeated principal-agent setting in which the principal cares about the agent’s verifiable effort as well as an extra profit that can be generated only if the agent is talented. The agent is overconfident about his talent and updates beliefs using Bayes’ rule. An exploitation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014347990
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