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Credit, incentives and reputation : an hedonic analysis of contractual wage profiles
Brandt, Loren; Hosios, Arthur J. - 1994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000891364
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Multiple agent models : a survey
Borland, Jeff - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000832809
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Multi-task principal-agent analyses : incentive contracts, asset ownership and job design
Holmström, Bengt; Milgrom, Paul - 1990
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000799495
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Employment contracts as a screening device in an institutional setting
Kazamaki Ottersten, Eugenia - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000822496
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Tournaments and incentives : heterogeneity and essentiality
Bhattacharya, Sudipto - 1983 - Rev
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000875775
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Contracts and money
Jovanovic, Boyan; Ueda, Masako - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000593355
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Group versus piece-rate contract
Lehto, Eero - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000957406
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Optimal contracts when a worker envies his boss
Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 24 (2008) 1, pp. 120-137
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003713997
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Relational contracts and job design
Schöttner, Anja (contributor) - 2005
This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003324054
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Insurance within the firm
Guiso, Luigi; Pistaferri, Luigi; Schivardi, Fabiano - In: Journal of political economy 113 (2005) 5, pp. 1054-1087
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003279960