Similar Search Results

Contracts, information and incentives in health care

Chalkley, Martin - In: The Elgar companion to health economics, (pp. 242-249). 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003389362

The existence and nature of ohysiician agency : evidence of stinting from the British NHS

Chalkley, Martin (contributor); Tilley, Colin (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002024046

Auditing without commitment

Khalil, Fahad - In: The Rand journal of economics 28 (1997) 4, pp. 629-640

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001231005

Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered

Crémer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad; Rochet, Jean-Charles - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000645707

Contracts and productive information gathering

Crémer, Jacques; Khalil, Fahad; Rochet, Jean-Charles - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000645709

Optimal task design : to integrate or separate planning and implementation?

Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Shin, Dongsoo - In: Journal of economics & management strategy : JEMS 15 (2006) 2, pp. 457-478

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003327280

Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting

Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno - In: Journal of economic theory 135 (2007) 1, pp. 35-67

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003546373

Contracts offered by bureaucrats

Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Lawarrée, Jacques - In: The Rand journal of economics 44 (2013) 4, pp. 686-711

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344504

Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy J. - In: The Rand journal of economics 46 (2015) 4, pp. 872-890

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011482296

Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting

Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno - 2005

We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003147725