This paper studies the role of public policy to promote efficiency in human capital accumulation in the representative agent framework. Agents accumulate human capital by spending time in home study and in publicly provided schools. The individual faces an aggregate externality in the...

This paper considers the twofold problem of compensation contracting and the design of a human capital investment scheme. Before contracting the principal and the agent can engage in a joint stochastic production process of exerting effort to raise the agent's productivity in the firm. The...

This paper considers a firm's optimal investment in training and motivation measures in a hidden action agency problem. We study how these measures interact with each other and the contract in order to create value for the firm. Productivity enhancing training can be firm specific or non-firm...

We study the role of public policy in promoting efficiency in human capital accumulation. Agents accumulate human capital by allocating time to home study and school attendance. The return to time spent in school is subject to congestion. The individual also faces an aggregate externality in...