We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’ behavior. This inspection game has a unique Bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...

Do financial market participants free-ride on liquidity? To address this question, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model where agents face idiosyncratic preference and technology shocks. A secondary financial market allows agents to adjust their portfolio of liquid and illiquid assets...

Can there be too much trading in financial markets? To address this question, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model, where agents face idiosyncratic preference and technology shocks. A financial market allows agents to adjust their portfolio of liquid and illiquid assets in response...

Do financial market participants free-ride on liquidity? To address this question, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model where agents face idiosyncratic preference and technology shocks. A secondary financial market allows agents to adjust their portfolio of liquid and illiquid assets...

We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents' behavior. This inspection game has a unique (Bayesian) equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...