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Delegating budgets when agents care about autonomy
Kuhn, Michael (contributor) - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002050615
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Chapter 2. Agency, Information and Corporate Investment
Stein, Jeremy C. - 2003
This essay surveys the body of research that asks how the efficiency of corporate investment is influenced by problems of asymmetric information and agency. I organize the material around two basic questions. First, does the external capital market channel the right amount of money to each firm?...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023874
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Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Ulbricht, Robert - 2014
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358239
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Dynamic managerial compensation : on the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014
We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may either increase or decrease with tenure. However, risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876
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When trust fades... : can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?
Major, Iván - 2013
Governments must usually take policy decisions with an imperfect knowledge of the economic actors' type or the actors' effort level. These issues are addressed within the framework of classic adverse selection or moral hazard models. I discuss in this paper how would the government’s and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211955
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The management of talent for innovation : optimal contracting for selection and incentives
Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo - 2018
Optimally reallocating human capital to tasks is key for an organization to successfully navigate a transition. We … study how to design employment contracts to allocate employees to different valuable projects within an organization given … unobservable effort. The organization has two types of valuable projects, high and low impact, only the former of which requires …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980048
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The optimal contract under adverse selection in a moral-hazard model with a risk-averse agent
Maréchal, François; Thomas, Lionel - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/12, pp. 1-22
This paper studies the optimal contract offered by a risk-neutral principal to a risk-averse agent when the agent’s hidden ability and action both improve the probability of the project being successful. We show that if the agent is sufficiently prudent and able, the principal induces a higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849217
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Dynamic, incentive-compatible contracting for health services
Levaggi, Rosella; Moretto, Michele; Pertile, Paolo - 2023
This paper aims to characterise a dynamic, incentive-compatible contract for the provision of health services, allowing for both moral hazard and adverse selection. Patients' severity changes over time following a stochastic process and is private information of the provider. We characterise the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014342117
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Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Ulbricht, Robert - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 253-278
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672191
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The Value of Precontract Information About an Agent's Ability in the Presence of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Banker, Rajiv D. - 2020
We analyze the expected value of information about an agent's type in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Information about the agent's type enables the principal to sort/screen agents of different types. The value of the information decreases in the variability of output and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841554