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Why it pays to Conceal : on the optimal timing of acquiring verifiable information
Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003383565
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Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents
Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie - 2014
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard, private information and risk-averse agents. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts with fixed and variable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010411960
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Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents
Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie; … - 2016
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents, who have private information on their productivity. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498942
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The impact of truth-telling and limited wealth in a principal-agent model
Feess, Eberhard; Ossig, Sonja; Walzl, Markus - In: Schmalenbach business review : sbr 57 (2005) 1, pp. 29-45
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002523339
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Discussion of "The impact of truth-telling and limited wealth in a principal-agent model"
Ewert, Ralf - In: Schmalenbach business review : sbr 57 (2005) 1, pp. 46-54
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002523355
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When should prinipals asquire verifiable information?
Feess, Eberhard; Schieble, Michael; Walzl, Markus - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002721593
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Safety regulation and monitor liability
Feess, Eberhard; Hege, Ulrich - In: Review of economic design : RED 7 (2002) 2, pp. 173-185
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001706869
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Delegated expertise - when are good projects bad news?
Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - In: Economics letters 82 (2004) 1, pp. 77-82
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001877567
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Why it pays to conceal : on the optimal timing of acquiring verifiable information
Feess, Eberhard; Schieble, Michael; Walzl, Markus - In: German economic review 12 (2011) 1, pp. 100-123
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009129655
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Incentive Schemes, Private Information and the Double-Edged Role of Competition for Agents
Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie; … - 2016
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents, who have private information on their productivity. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014162185