We examine whether executive stock options can induce excessive risk taking by managers in firms' security issue decisions. We find that CEOs whose wealth is more sensitive to stock return volatility due to their option holdings are more likely to choose debt over equity as a capital-raising...

The greater is the fraction of a firm's cash held overseas, the lower shareholders value that cash. This goes beyond a pure tax effect — the repatriation tax friction disrupts the firm's internal capital market, distorting its investment policy. Firms underinvest domestically and overinvest...

Stricter enforcement of post-employment restrictions that strengthens trade secrets protection also limits CEOs' alternative employment opportunities. We find that such mobility restrictions, which heightened CEO career concerns can dampen their risk-taking incentives and distort corporate...

This article surveys the recent literature on boards of directors and the interplay between director incentives and CEO incentives. The primary focus is on how the incentives and other characteristics of directors, boards and CEOs interact to affect firm performance. The article reviews the...