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The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in contract theory
Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017
Nobel for their fundamental contributions to contract theory. This article offers a short summary and discussion of their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626725
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Contracting with Opportunistic Partners : An Incomplete Contracts Approach
Casas-Arce, Pablo - 2016
After a contract is signed, contracting partners may engage in opportunistic behavior that circumvents the original … contract). We use an incomplete contracts approach to show that the anticipation and observability of such behavior are … conditions for the optimality of incomplete contracts, a simple characterization of the second-best contract, and some …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012985153
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The effect of the board composition on dividends: The case of Brazilian and Chilean family firms
Briano-Turrent, Guadalupe del Carmen; Fassler, Karen Watkins - In: European Journal of Family Business (EJFB) 10 (2020) 2, pp. 43-60
Based on the agency theory, this paper analyzes whether family firms pay more dividends compared to no-family firms and identifies whether the board composition affects the dividend policy. Brazil and Chile have established mandatory dividends, retain lower cash holdings, pay higher dividends...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012484834
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The Agency Problem in New Institutional Economics
Otáhal, Tomáš - In: Politická ekonomie 2009 (2009) 5, pp. 677-695
The aim of the paper is to set the agency problem into a broad context of New Institutional Economics with an emphasis on historical connections. In the first section, I explain the historical evolution of basic theoretical concepts like the theory of firm, the theory of market process and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545885
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Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats
Frey, Bruno S.; Osterloh, Margit - Center for Research in Economics, Management and the … - 2004
Corporate scandals, reflected in excessive management compensation and fraudulent accounts, cause considerable damage. Agency theory?s insistence on linking the compensation of managers and directors as closely as possible to firm performance is a major reason for these scandals. They cannot be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005162590
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La théorie des transactions informelles:une synthèse;The informal transactions theory:A synthesis
Charreaux, Gérard - Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de … - 1989
(VF)Les analyses des phénomènes organisationnels proposées par la théorie de l'agence, tant sous sa forme positive que normative, ne considèrent que la structure formelle des organisations. L'objet de cet article est de proposer une synthèse de la théorie des transactions informelles...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005111267
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Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats
Frey, Bruno S.; Osterloh, Margit - 2004
Corporate scandals, reflected in excessive management compensation and fraudulent accounts, cause considerable damage. Agency theory's insistence on linking the compensation of managers and directors as closely as possible to firm performance is a major reason for these scandals. They cannot be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012168201
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Cooperation and mistrust in relational contracts
Herz, Holger; Schmutzler, Armin; Volk, André - 2016
Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how reductions in clarity about the financial consequences of actions, induced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011521953
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How do labor representatives affect incentive orientation of executive compensation?
Dyballa, Katharina; Kraft, Kornelius - 2016
Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that labor's interest may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526742
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Cooperation and mistrust in relational contracts
Herz, Holger; Schmutzler, Armin; Volk, André - 2016
Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how reductions in clarity about the financial consequences of actions, induced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526817