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Contracting with Opportunistic Partners : An Incomplete Contracts Approach
Casas-Arce, Pablo - 2016
After a contract is signed, contracting partners may engage in opportunistic behavior that circumvents the original … contract). We use an incomplete contracts approach to show that the anticipation and observability of such behavior are … conditions for the optimality of incomplete contracts, a simple characterization of the second-best contract, and some …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012985153
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General Content of Management Contracts
Diathesopoulos, Michael D. - 2010
This paper presents management contracts (contracts under which corporate management is assigned to another company) as relational contracts, i.e. contracts to which relational contracts theory may apply and explain their character and specific features.We present the key concept and benefits...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142190
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Relational Contract Theory and Management Contracts : A Paradigm for the Application of the Theory of the Norms
Diathesopoulos, Michael D. - 2012
This paper examines management contracts as a paradigm for the application of relational contracts theory and especially of the theory of contractual and relational norms. This theory, deriving from Macauley's implications, but structured and analysed by I.R. MacNeil gives us a framework for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116026
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Breaking up a research consortium
Niedermayer, Andras; Wu, Jianjun - 2013
contract is a (secondbest) optimal screening device for firm A to screen out free-riders. With the additional constraint of … incentive to renegotiate the contract ex post. We also propose empirical strategies for identifying the three likely causes of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200195
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The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in contract theory
Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017
Nobel for their fundamental contributions to contract theory. This article offers a short summary and discussion of their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626725
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Rewards and punishments : informal contracting through social preferences
Chassang, Sylvain; Zehnder, Christian - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 1145-1179
This paper develops a positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671838
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Cooperation and Mistrust in Relational Contracts
Herz, Holger - 2016
Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how reductions in clarity about the financial consequences of actions, induced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012984557
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Cooperation and Mistrust in Relational Contracts
Herz, Holger - 2016
Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how reductions in clarity about the financial consequences of actions, induced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012981595
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Cooperation and mistrust in relational contracts
Herz, Holger; Schmutzler, Armin; Volk, André - 2016
Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how reductions in clarity about the financial consequences of actions, induced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011521953
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Cooperation and mistrust in relational contracts
Herz, Holger; Schmutzler, Armin; Volk, André - 2016
Work and trade relationships are often governed by relational contracts, in which incentives for cooperative action today stem from the prospective future benefits of the relationship. In this paper, we study how reductions in clarity about the financial consequences of actions, induced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526817