particular, we analyze how horizontal fairness concerns affect performance and efficiency in an environment characterized by …. This is not caused by monetary incentives per se since under both wage schemes it is profit-maximizing for agents to exert …

The canonical principal-agent problem involves a risk-neutral principal who must use incentives to motivate a risk … of this conclusion. Experimental subjects were routinely able to achieve efficiency in agent effort levels without … is true, then the lessons to be learned from principal-agency theory are all the wrong ones. Concentrating on incentives …

particular, we analyze how horizontal fairness concerns affect performance and efficiency in an environment characterized by …. This is not caused by monetary incentives per se since under both wage schemes it is profit-maximizing for agents to exert …

defense in merger control. -- Managerial Incentives ; Horizontal Mergers ; Antitrust ; Productive Efficiency Gains ; Synergies …We analyze the effects of synergies from horizontal mergers on managerial incentives. In contrast to synergies …, efficiency gains resulting from managerial effort are not merger specific, i.e., they may be realized by all firms before and …

agents with incentives to cut marginal costs prior to choosing output. We stress that synergies come at a cost which possibly … leads to a countervailing incentive effect: The merged firm's principal may be induced to stifle managerial incentives in … actually reduce consumer surplus which opposes the use of an efficiency defense in merger control. …