Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation problem where a principal decides on a project with uncertain profitability. A biased agent, who is initially as uninformed as the principal, privately learns the profitability...

We analyze delegation of a set of decisions over time by an informed principal to a potentially biased agent. Each period the principal observes a state of the world and sends a “cheap-talk” message to the agent, who is privately informed about her bias. We focus on principal-optimal...

This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias...

Das Papier befasst sich modelltheoretisch mit dem empirischen Phänomen des „Demokratischen Friedens“, der Beobachtung also, dass Demokratien ihre Konflikte in der Regel nicht kriegerisch lösen. Die Grundlage meiner Analyse bildet das Modell von Fearon (1995), ein Verhandlungsspiel mit 2...