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Individual or enterprise liability? : the roles of sanctions and liability under contractible and non-contractible safety efforts
Grepperud, Sverre - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 16 (2020) 3, pp. 1-28
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012384948
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The crowding-out of work ethics
Grepperud, Sverre; Pedersen, Pål Andreas - 2001
This paper analyses optimal contracts in a principal-agent model where the agent is intrinsically motivated at the outset and there is an endogenous relationship between the structure of incentive payments and intrinsic motivation (crowding effects). The analysis shows that crowding effects have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010290692
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Crowing effects and work ethics
Grepperud, Sverre; Pedersen, Pål Andreas - In: Labour : review of labour economics and industrial relations 20 (2006) 1, pp. 125-138
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003320311
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The crowding-out of work ethics
Grepperud, Sverre (contributor);  … - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]
This paper analyses optimal contracts in a principal-agent model where the agent is intrinsically motivated at the outset and there is an endogenous relationship between the structure of incentive payments and intrinsic motivation (crowding effects). The analysis shows that crowding effects have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001646558
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The Crowding-Out of Work Ethics
Grepperud, Sverre; Pedersen, Pål Andreas - Helseøkonomisk Forskningsprogram (HERO), Universitetet … - 2009
This paper analyses optimal contracts in a principal-agent model where the agent is intrinsically motivated at the outset and there is an endogenous relationship between the structure of incentive payments and intrinsic motivation (crowding effects). The analysis shows that crowding effects have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034708
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The Crowding-out of Work Ethics
Grepperud, Sverre; Pedersen, Pål Andreas - School of Economics, University of Kent - 2001
This paper analyses optimal contracts in a principal-agent model where the agent is intrinsically motivated at the outset and there is an endogenous relationship between the structure of incentive payments and intrinsic motivation (crowding effects). The analysis shows that crowding effects have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005635149