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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor competition and identifiability we add the possibility for clients to … identifiabilitiy (leading to several client-advisor interactions over the course of the game) or competition (allowing one advisor to …-telling under competition. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053
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Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018
factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor competition and identifiability, we add the possibility for clients to … make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706
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Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents
Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie - 2014
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a …-dependent exit options for agents. In contrast to screening models with perfect competition, we find that existence of equilibria … that the efficiency of variable pay depends on the degree of competition for agents: For small degrees of competition, low …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010411960
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Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents
Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie; … - 2016
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a … high degrees of vertical differentiation, i.e. low competition, low-ability agents are under-incentivized and exert too … little effort. For high degrees of competition, high-ability agents are over-incentivized and bear too much risk. For a range …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498942
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Competition and the Ratchet Effect
Charness, Gary - 2010
competition for principals or agents. While we do observe substantial and significant ratchet effects in the baseline (no … competition) case of our model, we find that ratchet behavior is nearly eliminated by labor-market competition; interestingly this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012715529
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Incentive Schemes, Private Information and the Double-Edged Role of Competition for Agents
Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie; … - 2016
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a … high degrees of vertical differentiation, i.e. low competition, low-ability agents are under-incentivized and exert too … little effort. For high degrees of competition, high-ability agents are over-incentivized and bear too much risk. For a range …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014162185
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Competition and the Ratchet Effect
Charness, Gary; Kuhn, Peter; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2021
competition for principals or agents. While we do observe substantial and significant ratchet effects in the baseline (no … competition) case of our model, we find that ratchet behavior is nearly eliminated by labor-market competition; interestingly this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324885
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The virtue of being underestimated : a note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2001 - This Version: June 2001
A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539692
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The virtue of being underestimated : a note on discriminatory contracts in hidden information models
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2001
A standard hidden information model is considered to study the influence of the a priori productivity distribution on the optimal contract. A priori more productive (hazard rate dominant) agents work less, enjoy lower rents, but generate a higher expected surplus.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011403219
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Incentives to Persevere
Incekara-Hafalir, Elif; Lee, Grace; Siah, Audrey; Xiao, Erte - 2022
Achieving success often requires persistent effort. We study the effectiveness of two reward mechanisms, all-or-nothing and piece-rate, to incentivize full completion of repeated tasks over time. Our theoretical analysis shows that exogenously imposing the all-or-nothing mechanism can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013290096