Building on the threefold classification to strategic design, internal scanning and strategic governance (Johanson 2009) in public agencies, this paper elaborates further the strategic governance perspective. The pivotal concept is the social network. First, the classification of types of...

This paper builds on the idea that trust is a matter of embedded agency where trustors and trustees, as actors, interpret the social context in which they are embedded. Insofar as this context is institutionalized, trust may be quite ‘normal' and achieved fairly easily by reference to...

This paper begins to develop a narrative theory of political agency. The financial crisis of 2008 has stirred new interest in the way that narratives define, channel and motivate human action. Stories about property windfalls raised the expectations of investors and seemed to confirm the...

We use administrative personnel records of a large British financial sector employer to investigate how workers' behaviour responds to remuneration differences and 'luck' in the promotion system. The main methodological innovation is the use of the early part of a panel dataset to construct an...

Using field and laboratory experiments, we demonstrate that the complexity of incentive schemes and worker bounded rationality can affect effort provision, by shrouding attributes of the incentives. In our setting, complexity leads workers to over-provide effort relative to a fully rational...

This study uses the Markov chain and agency theory to demonstrate a link between a salesperson's perceived attributes with customer retention and both optimal effort and commission, using a relational perspective. The purpose is to show sales managers that, with a customer survey, they can use...

This paper analyzes the bahavior of a principal with bounded memory who can offer a two-period performance-based contract to an agent. In the model he can choose whether to evaluate the agent after each period or only at the end of the second period. If the agent is wealth-constrained, the...

We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the agent's knowledge about the performance measure is ambiguous and he is averse towards ambiguity. We show that the principal may optimally provide no incentives or contract only on a subset of all informative performance measures....

We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully...