The theoretical approach in dealing with the aggregation of information in markets in general, and financial markets in particular considers information as an exogenous element to the system, focusing just on conditions and consequences of the efficient incorporation of information into prices....

We provide a new framework for using text as data in empirical models. The framework identifies salient information in unstructured text that can control for multidimensional heterogeneity among assets. We demonstrate the efficacy of the framework by re-examining principal-agent problems in...

This study investigates the impact of delegation structure of the top management team upon the quality of corporate voluntary disclosure on financial outcomes. The paper develops two competing hypotheses pertaining to the functional relationship between the degree of delegation and the...

Many financial arrangements reference market prices that are yet to be realized at the time of contracting and consequently susceptible to manipulation. Two of the most common such arrangements are: (i) market-on-close contracts, which reference the price prevailing at the end of an execution...

Contrary to the prediction of the classic adverse selection theory, a more informed trader could receive better pricing relative to a less informed trader in over‑the‑counter financial markets. Dealers chase informed orders to better position their future quotes and avoid winner’s curse in...

We investigate the impact of managerial investment diversion on a firm's investment paths and the investment-return relation in a dynamic q-theory model. When efficiency of investment is not observed by shareholders, the manager may divert investment for private benefits. An agency investment...

Securitization is a financial innovation that experiences a boom-bust cycle, as many other innovations before. This paper analyzes possible reasons for the breakdown of primary and secondary securitization markets, and argues that misaligned incentives along the value chain are the primary cause...

This paper derives an Equivalence Principle between organizational forms of supervisory and productive activities. We consider an organization with an agent privately informed on his productivity and a risk averse supervisor getting signals on the agent's type. In a centralized organization, the...

We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is non-observable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. We find that the principal does not provide individual incentives if...

Empirically, compensation systems generate substantial effort despite weak monetary incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal contract in the basic principal-agent problem and show that reciprocal motivations and explicit performance-based...