We construct a dynamic model of two-sided sorting in labor markets with multi-dimensional agent and firm heterogeneity. We apply it to study optimal party structure and the decision of how (de)centralized candidate recruitment should be. Parties are non-unitary actors and compete at the local...

I present a model in which a principal selects one among many agents to develop a project and influences the agent's ex post level of effort not by outcome-contingent rewards, but by the choice of the project's mission. The closer the project's mission to the agent's preferred mission, the...

We analyze the costs and benefits of using social image to foster virtuous behavior. A Principal seeks to motivate reputation-conscious agents to supply a public good. Each agent chooses how much to contribute based on his own mix of public-spiritedness, private signal about the value of the...

This was the first article explicitly on the theory of agency published in a regular, i.e., nonproceedings, issue of a journal in social science.The paper presents a fiduciary function model of policing in agency, with an application to attempts to influence regulatory performance by policing...

The fiduciary norm, which prescribes agent behavior solely for the goal of the principal, without regard for other goals, is defined in the context of the theory of agency. The fiduciary program, a set of procedures for determining the principal's preferences and acting for them, is then defined...

We analyze the costs and benefits of using social image to foster virtuous behavior. A Principal seeks to motivate reputation-conscious agents to supply a public good. Each agent chooses how much to contribute based on his own mix of public-spiritedness, private signal about the value of the...

We study a credence goods problem - that is, a moral hazard problem with non-contractible outcome - where altruistic experts (the agents) care both about their income and the utility of consumers (the principals). Experts' preferences over income and their consumers' utility are convex, such...

Principal-agent relationships are typically motivated by efficiency gains from comparative advantage. However, such delegation may also arise because it allows principals the pursuit of selfish outcomes while avoiding explicitly selfish behavior. We report laboratory experiments in which...

This paper introduces the theory of agency, identifies key concepts, relationships, and logics of agency. Norms of agency are identified and discussed, including the fiduciary norm. Problems of agency are identified and discussed. Applications of agency theory are made to regulation, the...