In this paper, I study a principal-multiagent model where the principal adopts the relative performance evaluation (RPE) as the compensation strategy, and where agents are connected in an information network. The ability of each agent is private information, but adjacent agents in the...

I develop a theoretical framework for studying viral communications through a principal agent set-up. The principal derives wealth from a signal in a society while agents in the society talk to each other. A society is likely to create a viral bubble if there is a short loop of positive...

In this work I combine the individualistic approach of economic theory with the social view of other social sciences to study corruption and the role of institutions and monitoring agencies when corruption takes place in a network structure. I will try to prove that if the social network is...

Information-based theories of financial intermediation focus on delegated monitoring. However, there is little evidence on how markets discipline intermediaries who fail at this function. We exploit the direct link between corporate fraud and monitoring failure and examine how a venture capital...

It is customary to focus on the network of interdependencies between firms to understand how and whether a shock to one firm will propagate to others. This paper argues that agency conflicts at the firm-level and not just the network structure, play a crucial role in amplifying or muting the...

This paper considers a tax evasion game where the tax authority intends to prevent income under-reporting within a network of heterogeneous taxpayers who are engaged in social interactions and exchange information. I propose a two-step game-theoretic optimal audit strategy from the point of view...

The paper introduces the concepts of incentive relation and implementation relation, discussing them in the context of agent-principal relationships. The incentives literature relevant to implementation is reviewed, as well as relevant literature on individual behavior in organizations and on...

Economic agents' behavior is affected by their position in a network, either exogenous or endogenous, in which they interact with a subset of neighbours only. The network's links, which may be generated by vertical and/or horizontal relations, or by more complex morphologies, may explain the...

We consider a productive network formed by agents with heterogeneous privately-known productivity types. Under convex cost of link formation, bilateral links create endogenous externalities. We calculate the "rearrangement cost" imposed on the entire network by each subset of other agents an...