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) generates a collective action problem among the subordinates appointed by the politician. As a result, the cronyism problem …This paper analyzes incentives for cronyism in politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014160550
This paper analyzes incentives for cronyism in politics within a political agency model with moral hazard. The analysis … returns to bringing in efficient individuals in the politician's team. Moreover, the nature of political promotions (such that … a crony's career is tied to that of his patron) leads to the alignment between political objectives of the politician …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068221
A well-functioning public expenditure management (PEM) system is considered a critical pillar of government efficiency, on par with a low-distortion tax system and efficient tax administration. The paper discusses PEM systems in developing countries using an analytical framework based on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779290
We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The … bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we …-powered incentives. We discuss how the bureaucrat may benefit from stricter accountability as it leads to larger budgets. Low …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938445
When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, and thus non-verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue with the agent. The agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information in order to collect a monetary penalty from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212662
This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415488
This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012160310
In this paper, I analyze the effects of monitoring on an agent’s incentives in a two-period principal-agent model in which the agent decides on his effort and corruptibility. The agent’s type and strategy are unknown to the principal. I compare incentive-compatible wages under three...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014198120
The paper introduces the concepts of incentive relation and implementation relation, discussing them in the context of agent-principal relationships. The incentives literature relevant to implementation is reviewed, as well as relevant literature on individual behavior in organizations and on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014032784
We analyze a principal-supervisor-two-agent hierarchy with soft information. The supervisor may be inefficient such that a noisy signal on the agents’ effort levels is observed. On one hand, the agents require risk premiums to work due to the noisy signal. On the other hand, the supervisor and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014033781