Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 19,186
Cover Image
Subjective evaluation versus public information
Bester, Helmut; Münster, Johannes - 2013
and not on the public signal. Nonetheless, public information is valuable as it facilitates truthful subjective evaluation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781395
Cover Image
Overwhelmed by routine tasks : a multi-tasking principal agent perspective
Demougin, Dominique; Helm, Carsten - 2022
We analyze a multitasking model with a verifiable routine task and a skill-dependent activity characterized by moral hazard. Contracts negotiated by firm/employee pairs follow from Nash bargaining. High- and low-skilled employees specialize, intermediate productivity employees perform both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013201713
Cover Image
Communicating subjective evaluations
Lang, Matthias - 2012 - this version: August 2013
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private … evaluation to the agent if the evaluation turns out to be bad. The justification assures the agent that the principal has not … distorted the evaluation downwards. In equilibrium, the wage increases in the agent's performance, when the principal justifies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569527
Cover Image
Wealth and the Principal-Agent Matching
Fagandini, Paulo - 2018
I study the role the agent's wealth plays in the principal-agent matching with moral hazard and limited liability. I consider wealth and talent as the agent's type, and size as the firm's (principal's) type. Because utility is not perfectly transferable in this setup, I use generalized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912553
Cover Image
Stochastic contracts and subjective evaluations
Lang, Matthias - 2021
Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from traditional moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties, which real-world contracts rarely use. I show that the implicit assumption of deterministic contracts makes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012697032
Cover Image
Objective versus subjective performance evaluations
Terstiege, Stefan - 2013
Why does incentive pay often depend on subjective rather than objective performance evaluations? After all, subjective evaluations entail a credibility issue. While the most plausible explanation for this practice is lack of adequate objective measures, I argue that subjective evaluations might...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198959
Cover Image
Standards and incentives under moral hazard with limited liability
Reinshagen, Felix - 2012
We consider a model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent and effort that is two-dimensional. One dimension of the agent's effort is observable and the other is not. The principal can thusmake the contract conditional not only on outcome but also on observable effort. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009490184
Cover Image
Merger performance and managerial incentives
Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - 2014
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430291
Cover Image
Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship
Budde, Jörg; Kräkel, Matthias - 2008
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383018
Cover Image
Merger efficiency and managerial incentives
Kräkel, Matthias; Müller, Daniel - 2013
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198514