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Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium and Wage Rigidity
Moen, Espen R.; Rosen, Asa - 2006
This paper examines the competitive search equilibrium when the workers' effort choice and type are private information …. We derive a modified Hosios rule determining the allocation of resources and analyze how private information influences … the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to changes in macroeconomic variables. Most importantly, private information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060646
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Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers
Non, Arjan - 2011
excessively strong incentives and a relatively high expected total compensation. -- reciprocity ; gift-exchange ; signaling game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009261791
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Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers
Non, Arjan - 2011
By incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some, but not all, workers care more for their principal when they are convinced that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121201
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Screening with Multitasking
Dinerstein, Michael; Opper, Isaac - 2022
What happens when employers would like to screen their employees but only observe a subset of output? We specify a model in which heterogeneous employees respond by producing more of the observed output at the expense of the unobserved output. Though this substitution distorts output in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014079145
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Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers
Non, Arjan - 2010
Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045822
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Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers
Non, Arjan - 2010
Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045826
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A Two-Dimensional Comparison of Signals in an Agency Model
Xie, Jia - 2012
In a general agency model with a risk-averse principal, we compare signals on two dimensions–their efficiencies at providing incentives for the agent's effort and efficiencies at conveying inference of the outcome. In order to tackle the moral hazard problem, the standard first order approach...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013114547
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Ranking of Signals in Multitask Agency Models
Xie, Jia - 2011
A lift zonoid criterion is proven to be necessary and sufficient for ranking signals in multi-task agency models, and can be applied to a broader set of signals than a multivariate MPS criterion. The two criteria coincide under certain conditions
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013123302
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Experimentation and Signal Dampening in Agency--The Ratchet Effect Revisited
Jeitschko, Thomas D.; Mirman, Leonard J.; Salgueiro, Egas M. - 1999
The dynamics of incentive contracts under asymmetric information have long been an important topic in economics. We … that after the first period the principal designs a second contract, taking the information available about the state of … the flow of information; and second, the principal attempts to dampen the first period signal to reduce up-front payments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014202378
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When Should Labor Contracts Be Nominal?
Martin, Antoine; Monnet, Cyril - 2002
We propose a theory to explain the choice between nominal and indexed labor contracts. We find that contracts should be indexed if prices are difficult to forecast and nominal otherwise. Our analysis is based on a principal-agent model developed by Jovanovic and Ueda (1997) in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122274