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Stakeholders, bargaining and strikes
Shields, Michael; Wheatley Price, Stephen - 2001
We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a … potential willingness of the stakeholder to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency …. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011405186
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Stakeholders, Bargaining and Strikes
Manzini, Paola; Ponsati, Clara - 2021
We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a … potential willingness of the stakeholder to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency …. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320730
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Stakeholders, bargaining and strikes
Manzini, Paola; Ponsatí, Clara - 2001
We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a … potential willingness of the stakeholder to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency …. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001647017
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Optimal Delegation in Nash Bargaining
Kirstein, Roland - 2009
percentage of the bargaining result, and a bonus payment (or penalty) if bargaining fails. Conventional wisdom of contract theory … the bonus should be small or even negative. Drawing on the symmetric Nash bargaining solution, this paper argues that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012718860
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Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512
I study a repeated principal-agent game with long‐term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are observable but not contractible, so they can only be incentivized through implicit agreements formed in equilibrium. I show that contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553
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Delegation with incomplete and renegotiable contracts
Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2008 - This version: April 2008
It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001777
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Contract (re-)negotiation with private and common values
Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2017
We analyze the contracting problem of a principal who faces an agent with private information and cannot commit to not renegotiating a chosen contract. We model this by allowing the principal to propose new contracts any number of times after observing the contract choice of the agent. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753991
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Bargaining Power in Sequential Contracting
Marx, Leslie M.; Shaffer, Greg - 2022
Bargaining power affects the terms of trade negotiated between agents in the economy. When multiple players with … interrelated payoffs negotiate contracts, the outcome of each negotiation depends on all the players' bargaining powers. In a model … bargaining power and increasing in the second seller's bargaining power, while the second seller's payoff is decreasing in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013291658
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Contract design with limited commitment
Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2018
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946012
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Career Concerns of Bargainers
Fingleton, John; Raith, Michael - 2004
This paper studies strategic bargaining in which a seller and a buyer are each represented by an agent. Potential …-door" bargaining, in which principals can observe the entire bargaining game as well as its outcome, with "closed-door" bargaining, in … closed doors, which leads to a less efficient bargaining outcome. Their principals may therefore prefer to let their agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034671