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Incentives and the sorting of altruistic agents into street-level bureaucracies
Buurman, Margaretha; Dur, Robert A. J. - 2010
Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377373
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Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies
Buurman, Margaretha - 2008
Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012722555
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Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street-Level Bureaucracies
Buurman, Margaretha; Dur, Robert - 2021
Many street-level bureaucrats (such as caseworkers) have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of such a street-level bureaucracy and study the implications of its personnel policy on the self-selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324768
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U-type versus J-type tournaments
Kräkel, Matthias - 2001
In practice, two types of tournaments can be distinguished - U-type and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments …, workers receive prizes that have been fixed in advance. In J-type tournaments, the employer fixes an aggregate wage bill in …-type tournaments if the number of workers is large, whereas the opposite holds for small numbers of workers. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538870
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The potential output gains from using optimal teacher incentives : an illustrative calibration of a hidden action model
Mehta, Nirav - 2018
This paper examines the potential output gains from the implementation of optimal teacher incentive pay schemes, by calibrating the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) hidden action model using data from Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), a teacher incentive pay experiment implemented in Andhra...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011878506
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Implicit vs. explicit incentives : theory and a case study
Demougin, Dominique; Fabel, Oliver; Thomann, Christian - 2009
We derive the optimal contract between a principal and a liquidity-constrained agent in a stochastically repeated environment. The contract comprises a court-enforceable explicit bonus rule and an implicit fixed salary promise that must be self-enforcing. Since the agent's rent increases with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850322
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When randomization in collective tournaments is profitable for the principal
Lehmann, Stefanie Aniela - 2008
In the context of principal-agent theory risk is largely seen as a source that causes inefficiencies and lowers incentives and accordingly is not in the principal’s interest. In this paper I compare two different designs of a collective tournament where output in a team is generated through a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003850395
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You don't always get what you pay for
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2007
Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. Does rewarding success, i.e., paying a bonus, increase effort in this case? I find that bonuses have not only an incentive but also an income effect. Overall, bonuses paid for success may...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003592884
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Should you allow your agent to become your competitor? : On non-compete agreements in employment contracts
Kräkel, Matthias (contributor); Sliwka, Dirk (contributor) - 2006
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003301668
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Limited liability and the trade-off between risk and incentives
Kräkel, Matthias - 2007
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383029