Showing 1 - 10 of 1,093
best we mean that one can find mechanisms that satisfy efficiency of decision, dominant strategy incentive compatibility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538720
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946012
common agency by constructing a pseudo-potential for the game. Robust contracts make explicit how the efficiency of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013253715
order additivity condition. This result contrasts well with various results on the incompatibility between efficiency and ex …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003819939
It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001777
In a common agency game a set of principals promises monetary transfers to an agent whichdepend on the action he will take. The agent then chooses the action, and is paid the corresponding transfers. Principals announce their transfers simultaneously. This game has many equilibria; Bernheim and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014192030
A hedonic analysis of principal-agent employment contracts is developed in which workers and employers exchange labor services and contractual payment patterns and is applied to contract data from a household-level survey in rural China in 1935. The results indicate that credit market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014102793
We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507906
We use the theory of abstract convexity to study adverse-selection principal-agent problems and two-sided matching problems, departing from much of the literature by not requiring quasilinear utility. We formulate and characterize a basic underlying implementation duality. We show how this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010499578
We generalize the disutility of effort function in the linear-Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) puremoral hazardmodel.We assume that agents are heterogeneous in ability. Each agent's ability is observable and treated as a parameter that indexes the disutility of effort associated with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012612627