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best we mean that one can find mechanisms that satisfy efficiency of decision, dominant strategy incentive compatibility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538720
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001573554
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895796
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946012
This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013255847
This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents’ social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents’ social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013269734
common agency by constructing a pseudo-potential for the game. Robust contracts make explicit how the efficiency of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013253715
order additivity condition. This result contrasts well with various results on the incompatibility between efficiency and ex …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212939
It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216262
A hedonic analysis of principal-agent employment contracts is developed in which workers and employers exchange labor services and contractual payment patterns and is applied to contract data from a household-level survey in rural China in 1935. The results indicate that credit market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014102793