This study examines the differences in the relationships between different stakeholders in conventional and Islamic financial institutions. The accounting and finance literature identifies the major contractual relationships as being those between managers and shareholders (employment contracts)...

Information-based theories of financial intermediation focus on delegated monitoring. However, there is little evidence on how markets discipline intermediaries who fail at this function. We exploit the direct link between corporate fraud and monitoring failure and examine how a venture capital...

We investigate the Dead Hand Proxy Put, a contractual innovation in corporate debt agreements that may impact hedge fund activism. We find the provision principally in loans, not bonds, and provide evidence linking adoption of the provision to hedge fund activism. Further, controlling for...

We study the problem of multiple financiers who want to extract income from a privately informed agent and design their financial contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between financiers has strong implications for the shapes of financial contracts....

The paper explores the monitoring by 'external Names' (the principals) of 'working Names' (their agents) in the Lloyd's insurance market of the 1970s and early 1980s. The market was relying heavily on external Names to finance its rapid growth; and these principals were dependent upon their...

This paper examines the determinants of IPO underpricing in a unique and comprehensive, sample of 86 IPO firms from across North Africa between 2000 and 2013. The findings suggest that, underpricing is used as a mechanism by which to stimulate excess demand (subscription) for newly, issued stock...

We develop a firm-dynamics model with moral hazard, which arises because some productivity shocks are privately observed by firm managers only. We characterize the optimal contract and its implications for firm size, growth, and managerial pay-performance sensitivity, which allow us toquantify...

We examine the impact of corporate risk-taking on firm-level real earnings management. We find that firms with higher risk-taking engage in higher real earnings management. Our results are robust to a series of robustness tests, including simultaneous least squares approach, firm fixed effect,...