Asset owners (principals) typically do not manage their own investments and leave this job to delegated managers (agents). What is best for the asset owner, however, is usually not best for the fund manager. Additional agency conflicts arise when the asset owner does not know the quality and...

Corporate governance is a recent concept that encompasses the costs caused by managerial misbehavior. Corporate governance is concerned with how organizations in general, and corporations in particular, produce value and how that value is distributed among the members of the corporation, its...

Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure in Manufacture Public Companies at Indonesian Stock Exchange. This research aimed at knowing the influence of audit quality, proportion of independent commissioner, audit committee, firm size, managerial ownership and leverage. It used purposive...

Partial ownership of stock in multiple competing firms is an important scholarly and policy topic in both corporate and antitrust law. Until now, the discussion has focused on ownership. This essay shifts the debate from a focus on common ownership to a focus on common control. No prior work has...

Debt ownership by equity-holding managers aligns their incentives more closely with those of creditors, thereby reducing agency costs of debt. We test this hypothesis by examining how terms of bank loans are related to executive pension and deferred compensation, i.e., inside debt held by...

This study tests two opposing views of institutional investors — monitoring versus short-termism. We present evidence that institutional investor stability is negatively associated with one-year-ahead stock price crash risk, consistent with the monitoring theory of institutional investors but...

Prior SEC inquiries concerning self-dealing in securities lending programs suggest potential conflicts of interest when funds employ lending agents that are affiliated with their sponsor. We posit that the level of self-dealing is potentially greater, and mutual funds' securities lending returns...

We examine the relation between passive ownership and financial reporting quality measured by Beneish's (1999) earnings' manipulation score (M-score). We find that passive ownership is negatively related to M-score and to the likelihood of being designated as a “manipulator” firm. However,...

The corporate governance literature has shown that self-interested controlling owners tend to divert corporate resources for private benefits at the expense of other shareholders. Such behavior leads the controlling owners to prefer long maturity debt to short maturity debt, to avoid frequent...

This study uses the 2008 mortgage crisis to demonstrate how the relationship between vertical integration and performance crucially depends on corporate governance. Prior research has argued that the vertical integration of mortgage origination and securitization aligned divisional incentives...