This article describes the anatomy of health insurance. It begins by considering the optimal design of health insurance policies. Such policies must make tradeoffs appropriately between risk sharing on the one hand and agency problems such as moral hazard (the incentive of people to seek more...

We study the existence of a profitable unemployment insurance market in a dynamic economy with adverse selection rooting in information on future job losses. The new feature of the model is that the insurer and workers interact repeatedly. Repeated interactions make it possible to threaten...

We show that on-demand insurance contracts, an innovative form of coverage recently introduced through the InsurTech sector, can serve as a screening device. To this end, we develop a new adverse selection model consistent with Wilson (1977), Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978). Consumers have...

The paper surveys the characteristics of explicit systems of deposit insurance in 68 countries. It compares these actual practices with a set of best practices that has been adopted by IMF staff for their advice to member countries. These best practices seek to establish a system of deposit...

Abstract We develop a tractable model of competitive insurance markets with a continuum of types and exogenous restrictions on the set of allowed contracts. Our model nests, as special cases, the market for lemons of Akerlof (1970) and the unrestricted contracts setting of Rothschild and...

We study physician agency and optimal payment policy in the context of an expensive medication used in dialysis care. Using Medicare claims data we estimate a structural model of treatment decisions, in which physicians differ in their altruism and marginal costs, and this heterogeneity is...

This paper examines the role that organization structure and contract design played in resolving economic and political problems that arose during Germany's privatization process. We find that German officials structured organizations and contracts in a way that made credible the government's...

Directors and supervisory board members (officers) are increasingly being held personally liable. Directors & Officers (D&O) liability insurance offers directors and supervisory board members ample protection against directors' and officers' liability. On the one hand, this has many advantages...