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Overconfidence and managers' responsibility hoarding
Nieken, Petra; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim; Zhou, Nannan - 2011
introduce a model, in which managers and agents exert effort in a joint production, after the manager decides on the allocation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571367
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Family or Nonfamily? CEO Appointment in a Multitask Model with Economic and Non-Economic Tasks
Kragl, Jenny - 2019
empirical reality is different. A surprisingly large share of firms is run by family managers. Our study provides a rational … of family and non-family managers in a moral-hazard model with imperfect performance measures, where managerial tasks are … nonfamily managers, the associated effort distortion towards economic outcomes is less pronounced for family managers. When …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012895440
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Intrinsic and Extrinsic Incentives to Support Motivation and Performance of Public Organizations
Coccia, Mario - 2019
In management, incentives are a reward to motivate people and create favorable conditions directed to achieve specific goals and support organizational development. This conceptual paper analyses differences between intrinsic and extrinsic incentives to suggest management implications directed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012889086
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The Pygmalion Effect : An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences
Daido, Kohei; Itoh, Hideshi - 2021
We attempt to formulate and explain two types of self- fulfilling prophecy, called the Pygmalion effect (if a supervisor thinks her subordinates will succeed, they are more likely to succeed) and the Galatea effect (if a person thinks he will succeed, he is more likely to succeed). To this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013318687
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Delegation of Decisions on the Spanish Shop Floor : From Agency Theory to a Transactional and Organizational Approach (in Spanish)
Diéguez, Isabel; Vázquez, Xosé H. - 2009
The paper addresses the problem of the allocation of decision rights on the shop floor. We try to solve particular limitations of Agency Theory by presenting a complementary approach based on Organization Theory and Transaction Cost Economics. Empirical evidence stems from two industries with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204480
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Allocating Decision Rights on the Shop Floor : A Perspective from Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory
Vázquez, Xosé H. - 2009
This paper explores the links that the allocation of decision rights on the shop floor maintains with labor transaction attributes and several structural traits of the firm. The approach is based on the transaction cost apparatus and harnesses the theoretical and empirical background provided by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204549
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Provision of Management Incentives in Bankrupt Firms
Goyal, Vidhan K. - 2015
This paper examines the use of key employee retention and incentive plans (KERPs) in bankrupt firms. We find that firms in Chapter 11 are more likely to offer KERPs when firms are located in thicker employment markets, when creditors have strong control, and when bankrupt firms have complex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036729
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Belief Precision and Effort Incentives in Promotion Contests
Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - 2012
The career concerns literature predicts that incentives for effort decline as beliefs about ability become more precise (Holmström, 1982/1999). In contrast, we show that effort can increase with belief precision if promotions to better-paid jobs make the returns to reputation non-linear. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183448
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Has moral hazard become a more important factor in managerial compensation?
Gayle, George-Levi; Miller, Robert Allen - In: The American economic review 99 (2009) 5, pp. 1740-1769
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003936335
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Does codetermination affect the composition of variable versus fixed parts of executive compensation?
Dyballa, Katharina; Kraft, Kornelius - 2015
Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that interests of labor may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011308423