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Tournaments versus piece rates under limited liability
Kräkel, Matthias - 2004
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004: The existing literature on the comparison of tournaments and piece rates as alternative incentive schemes has focused on the case of unlimited liability. However, in practice real workers' wealth is typically restricted....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343971
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Limited liability and the trade-off between risk and incentives
Kräkel, Matthias - 2007
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk … risk and incentives can be explained. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383029
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Preemptive behavior in sequential tournaments
Jost, Peter-J.; Kräkel, Matthias - 2000
Rank-order tournaments are usually modeled simultaneously. However, real tournaments are often sequentially. We show that agents' strategic behavior significantly differs in sequential tournaments compared to simultaneous tournaments. In a sequential tournament, under certain conditions the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335241
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Does a short-term increase in incentives boost performance?
Angelova, Vera; Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta - 2017
competition affect agents' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a … sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results suggest that a short-term increase in incentives induces a behavioral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895040
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Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents
Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie - 2014
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard, private information and risk-averse agents. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts with fixed and variable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010411960
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Optimal incentive contracts for a worker who envies his boss : presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute, Workshop on Dissecting Globalization, July 2004
Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2004
. Such behavior may call for high-powered incentives, so that increased effort by the worker little increases the income of … various assumptions about the object and generality of envy. Envy amplifies the effect of incentives on effort and, therefore …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450877
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Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents
Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie; … - 2016
This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents, who have private information on their productivity. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498942
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Managerial Incentives and IPO Failure Risk
Colak, Gonul - 2019
%. The Pay Gap between the CEO and its subordinate executives (tournament incentives) also plays a major role in lowering IPO … failure risk. The effectiveness of CEO pay is strengthened among well-governed firms, whereas tournament incentives are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898102
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The Real Effects of Tournament Incentives : The Case of Firm Innovation
Jia, Ning - 2020
This paper examines the effects of promotion-based tournament incentives for non-CEO executives on corporate innovation …. We find that firms with greater tournament incentives, which are measured as the pay gap between the CEO and other … tournament incentives. The attraction of talent and the reduction in excessive board interventions appear two plausible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012855711
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Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts
Teyssier, Sabrina - 2008
This paper reports on the results of an experiment testing whether the agents selfselect between a competitive payment scheme and a revenue-sharing scheme depending on their inequity aversion. Average efficiency should be increased when these payment schemes are endogenously chosen by agents. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216314