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When partnerships come to an end, partners must find a way to efficiently reallocate the commonly owned assets to those who value them the most. This requires that the aforementioned members possess enough financial resources to buy out the others’ shares. I investigate ex post efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324334
This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399062
We study optimal selling strategies of a seller who is poorly informed about the buyer’s value for the object. When the maxmin seller only knows that the mean of the distribution of the buyer's valuations belongs to some interval then nature can keep him to payoff zero no matter how much...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011298549
This paper studies an informed mechanism designer problem in which the principal’s private information is a number of agents. We define mechanical equivalence such that it holds if each agent’s and the principal’s perspectives are consistent in the sense that a conversion problem for a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013404832
We study informed principal problems in a bilateral trade environment in which a seller and a buyer have private information about types affecting their interdependent valuations. Their types might be affiliated and the traders might have different prior beliefs. The informed seller has full...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014156313
In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989366
Online "feedback mechanisms" - also known as "reputation systems" - have been implemented in the most important private e-markets, such as eBay, Yahoo!, Amazon to foster trust and cooperation among trading partners. In this paper we discuss the main issues relevant for the optimal design of such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014058809
We develop a model where two players with asymmetric preferences engage in a contest game. The key novelty is the introduction of multi-dimensional rewards. We characterize the optimal prize allocation that maximizes aggregate effort. When heterogeneity in preferences is strong and the designer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212096
This paper studies procurement contracts where a buyer can either divide full production among multiple suppliers or award the entire production to a single supplier. We examine the effect of using multiple suppliers on investment incentives. In a framework of generalized second-price auctions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013129999
We study the implications of delegating bids to a bidding agency for the revenues and efficiency of the Generalized Second-Price auction, the standard sales mechanism for allocating online ad space. The agency maximizes both its own profits and the advertisers' surplus and implements collusive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013307805