Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 896
Cover Image
Becoming "We" instead of "I". Identity management and incentives in the workplace
Donze, Jocelyn; Gunnes, Trude - 2013
identity and positively influence their effort. We develop an agency model, in which employees have both a personal and a … incentives. Second, by creating a shared identity in the workforce, the firm is able to reduce the adverse selection problem. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011968530
Cover Image
Becoming “We” instead of “I”. Identity management and incentives in the workplace
Donze, Jocelyn; Gunnes, Trude - Statistisk Sentralbyrå, Government of Norway - 2013
identity and positively influence their effort. We develop an agency model, in which employees have both a personal and a … incentives. Second, by creating a shared identity in the workforce, the firm is able to reduce the adverse selection problem. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010754873
Cover Image
Becoming "we" instead of "I", identity management and incentives in the workplace
Donze, Jocelyn; Gunnes, Trude - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 148 (2018), pp. 105-120
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985958
Cover Image
Empowerment and the Dark Side of Delegation
Kräkel, Matthias - 2018
The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the preferences of principal and agent are exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012929070
Cover Image
Empowerment and the dark side of delegation
Kräkel, Matthias - 2018
The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the preferences of principal and agent are exogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011795221
Cover Image
Should you allow your agent to become your competitor? : On non-compete agreements in employment contracts
Kräkel, Matthias (contributor); Sliwka, Dirk (contributor) - 2006
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003301668
Cover Image
Should you allow your agent to become your competitor? : on non-compete agreements in employment contracts
Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371071
Cover Image
Fixed Salary or Incentive Contract? The Effect of Stickiness of Compensation Contracts
Wakabayashi, Toshiaki - 2022
This study adopts behavioral contract theory through a mathematical model and clarifies the situation in which a fixed–salary contract is preferable to incentives–based one for the principal. Theoretically, the expected utility for the principal is higher under an incentives–based contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296794
Cover Image
Dynamic Contracting in Asset Management under Investor-Partner-Manager Relationship
Keppo, Jussi; Touzi, Nizar; Ruiting, Zuo - 2021
We study incentive contracts in asset management business under dynamic actions and relationships between an investor, a partner of an investment company, and a fund manager of the company. The investor cannot perfectly observe the partner and manager’s actions, and similarly, the partner...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242101
Cover Image
Social comparison and optimal contracts in competition for managerial talent
Ulrichshofer, Anna; Walzl, Markus - 2020
We analyze the impact of social comparison on optimal contract design under imperfect labor market competition for managerial talent. Adding a disutility of social comparison as induced by a ranking of verifiable efforts to the multi-task model by Bénabou and Tirole (2016), we demonstrate that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253115