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The agency costs of agency capitalism : activist investors and the revaluation of governance rights
Gilson, Ronald J.; Gordon, Jeffrey N. - 2013
Equity ownership in the United States no longer reflects the dispersed share ownership of the canonical Berle-Means firm. Instead, we observe the reconcentration of ownership in the hands of institutional investment intermediaries, which gives rise to what we call “the agency costs of agency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009697564
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The impact of duality on managerial decisions and performance : evidence from the mutual fund industry
Kempf, Alexander; Pütz, Alexander; Sonnenburg, Florian - 2013 - This version: October 2013
We study the decisions and performance of managers who are also chair of the board (duality managers). We hypothesize that duality managers take more risky decisions and deliver worse performance than non-duality managers due to reduced level of control and replacement risk. Using the mutual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010194852
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Institutional Shareholder Distraction, Agency Conflicts, and the Cost of Debt
El Ghoul, Sadok - 2020
Using a new measure of shareholder inattention based on exogenous industry shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we document a positive and significant relation between firms with distracted institutional shareholders and the cost of debt financing. This effect is stronger for firms with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012843982
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Board Monitoring, CEO Incentives, and Shareholder Activism
Keusch, Thomas - 2018
This paper studies how hedge fund activism reshapes board monitoring, CEO incentives and compensation. I find that activists target CEOs who have co-opted the board, have poor performance records and weak equity portfolio incentives, are less subject to relative performance evaluation (RPE) but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012936387
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Agents Watching Agents? : Evidence from Pension Fund Ownership and Firm Value
Woidtke, Tracie - 2017
This paper examines the valuation effects associated with the incentive structures of different types of institutional investors using the ownership levels of public and private pension funds in a firm. The results suggest that institutional monitoring is associated with valuation effects when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012943732
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Corporate Governance in the Presence of Active and Passive Delegated Investment
Corum, Adrian Aycan - 2020
We examine the governance role of delegated portfolio managers. In our model, investors decide how to allocate their wealth between passive funds, active funds, and private savings, and asset management fees are endogenously determined. Funds' ownership stakes and asset management fees determine...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824723
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Activism and Takeovers
Burkart, Mike - 2020
We compare activism and takeovers from a blockholder's perspective who can invest effort into improving firm value. Profits from the two intervention modes move in opposite directions when the marginal return to effort changes such that activism, although less efficient, can be more profitable....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012856282
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Activist Directors and Agency Costs : What Happens When an Activist Director Goes on the Board?
Coffee, John C. - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012930453
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Shareholder Coordination, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value
Huang, Jiekun - 2014
Ease of coordination can enable diffuse shareholders to play a more effective role in corporate governance and thereby … coordination, I find evidence that ease of coordination among institutional shareholders is positively associated with firm value …. To identify the effect of shareholder coordination on firm value, I exploit two plausibly exogenous shocks to shareholder …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060708
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Different vision of stewardship : understanding interactions between large investment managers and activist shareholders
Gomtsian, Suren - 2021
The rise of a small group of investment (asset) managers with an enormous potential to influence corporate decision-making has reinforced attention to shareholder stewardship as one of the pillars of corporate governance. But weak incentives to invest in shareholder oversight and limited...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507489