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I study the interaction between optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries. First, two …. Then the buyer designs the procurement mechanism and sellers who outsourced production subcontract with their respective …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340964
The paper studies procurement contracts with pre-project investigations in the presence of adverse selection and moral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935679
.g., revenue maximization in auctions or cost minimization in procurement) typically calls for distortions in allocative efficiency …-enhancing hidden investment to a standard sequential screening model of procurement, and find that (1) with convex investment cost …, mitigation of allocative distortion must arise; and (2) such mitigation can even be extreme with linear investment cost---procurement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012849777
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397659
We study a principal-agent model. The parties are symmetrically informed at first; the principal then designs the screening mechanism and, concurrently, the process by which the agent learns his type. Because the agent can opt out of the mechanism ex post, it must leave him with nonnegative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012900904
We study a principal-agent model. The parties are symmetrically informed at first; the principal then designs the process by which the agent learns his type and, concurrently, the screening mechanism. Because the agent can opt out of the mechanism ex post, it must leave him with nonnegative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012868561
I study a mechanism design problem in which a designer allocates a single good to one of several agents, and the mechanism is followed by an aftermarket -- a post-mechanism game played between the agent who acquired the good and third-party market participants. The designer has preferences over...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012855036
The Introduction to the Symposium Issue on “Dynamic Contract and Mechanism Design” of the Journal of Economic Theory provides an overview of the dynamic mechanism design literature. We then introduce the papers that are contained in the Symposium issue and finally conclude by discussing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018184
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists which provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014130155
This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415488