Over 20 years, M&A contracts have more than doubled in size – from 35 to 88 single-spaced pages in this paper's font. They have also grown significantly in linguistic complexity – from post-graduate “grade 20” to post-doctoral “grade 30”. A substantial portion (lower bound ~20%) of...

One of the most relevant and exciting issues in the latest decades in economics had been the asymmetric information and uncertainty, and their effects on market processes and efficiency. Some studies show that markets where information problems or/and uncertainty arise tend to be "networked",...

This paper considers a financing problem for an innovative firm that is considering launching a web-based platform. Our model is the first one that analyzes an entrepreneur's choice between security tokens (via a security token offering (STO)) and utility tokens (via initial coin offering...

We study a two-period perfectly competitive industry where firms are run by agents privately informed about their (persistent) costs, and principals can only use spot contracts. The interplay between payoff externalities and spot contracting has novel implications for industry dynamics. With...

This paper considers a financing problem for an innovative firm that is launching a web-based platform. The entrepreneur, on one hand, faces a large degree of demand uncertainty onhis product and on the other hand has to deal with incentive problems of professional blockchainparticipants who...

We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante...

We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante...

The paper provides an analysis of the second-degree price discrimination problem on a monopolistic two-sided market. In a simple framework with two distinct types of agents on market side 1, we show that under incomplete information the extent of platform access for high-demand agents is...

We study a principal-agent model. The parties are symmetrically informed at first; the principal then designs the screening mechanism and, concurrently, the process by which the agent learns his type. Because the agent can opt out of the mechanism ex post, it must leave him with nonnegative...

The canonical selection contracting programme takes the agent's participation decision as deterministic and finds the optimal contract, typically satisfying this constraint for the worst type. Upon weakening this assumption of known reservation values by introducing independent randomness into...