Showing 1 - 10 of 943
bad. In a market setting with multiple consumers per expert, a cross-consumer externality arises: one consumer's payment … raises the expert's income, which makes the non-selfish part of preferences more important and thereby induces the expert to … provides a novel rationale for the wide-spread use of price regulation and licensing in real-world markets for expert services. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431181
We study optimal direct mechanisms for a credence goods expert who can be altruistic or spiteful. The expert has …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010193284
We extend Akerlof's (1970) "Market for Lemons" by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is at display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes' rule but take the noisy signal at face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009375745
We extend Akerlof (1970)'s 'Market for Lemons' by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is on display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes' rule but take the noisy signal at face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342215
Using a sample of long-term supply contracts collected from SEC filings, I show that hold-up concerns and information asymmetry are important determinants of contract design. Asymmetric information between buyers and suppliers leads to shorter term contracts. However, when longer duration...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086012
of Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs) to publicly disclose vs. cover-up fraud in an incomplete information environment … relative likelihood of fraud detection by a ldquo;vigilantrdquo; vs. a ldquo;laxrdquo; SRO type. In particular, a fraud … disclosure equilibrium is supported when subjects are informed that the ldquo;vigilantrdquo; SRO is more likely to detect fraud …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012708131
We study the relationship between the precision of information about the performance of an agent in a market, and the incentives this agent has for exerting effort to produce high quality. We show that this relationship is not monotonic. There exists a threshold beyond which any further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014067422
This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic … he is biased into the same direction as the expert. The mediator improves communication, however, only if some …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008906024
This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic … he is biased into the same direction as the expert. The mediator improves communication, however, only if some …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009408044
Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530053