Previous studies have primarily focused on the relative success of collectively owned enterprises (COEs) in China during the early years of reform, but they have ignored the agency problems inherent in this type of organizational form that may be an obstacle to further improving performance in a...

Wir analysieren das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung. Ferner arbeiten wir einige aufgrund wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Überlegungen zu erwartende Probleme heraus und prognostizieren mögliche ökonomische Auswirkungen des Gesetzes. Des Weiteren gehen wir im Rahmen einer...

This Article reports results of an empirical study that suggests that the current economic crisis has changed managerial behavior in the US in a way that may impede economic recovery. The study finds a strong, statistically significant and economically meaningful, positive correlation between...

This paper analyzes the dividend payout by Romanian companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange in connection with the changes in corporate taxes. If the tax burden on corporate gross incomes is increasing, the companies' management can follow two reasons in deciding the dividend payout: to...

Many companies continue to go public with takeover defenses even though institutional investors zealously oppose defenses in public companies. In this Article, I analyze the determinants of takeover defenses at IPO firms using an empirical analysis of 259 IPOs from 2008-12, interviews with...

Ownership structure is one of the key determinants constituting internal corporate governance, which is especially crucial in emerging markets. This study explores the effects of insider shareholding, an obvious characteristic of ownership structure, on corporate governance. The empirical...

Morse, Nanda and Seru (2011) interpret the data to suggest that more powerful CEOs ex-post change their incentive contracts more. My paper points out a number of issues with their inference. First and most importantly, MNS do not control for the fact that not just the most powerful but almost...

Corporate capital structure decisions are key determinants of firm performance. The agency theory suggests that debt financing is one of the mechanisms to mitigate agency problems and thus to improve firm performance. This paper provides important evidence on the performance effects of capital...

We study the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity, pay-risk sensitivity, and shareholder voting outcomes as part of the "say-on-pay" provision of the 2010 U.S. Dodd-Frank Act. Consistent with our hypothesis, we provide evidence that shareholders tend to approve of compensation...

We examine whether, how, and why acquirer shareholder voting matters. We show that acquirers with low institutional ownership, high deal risk, and high agency costs are more likely to bypass shareholder voting. Such acquirers have lower announcement returns and make higher offers than those who...