This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model:(1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant...

A model of over-the-counter markets is proposed. Some asset buyers are informed in that they can identify high-quality assets. Heterogeneous sellers with private information choose what type of buyers they want to trade with. When the measure of informed buyers is low, there exists a unique and...

A model of over-the-counter markets is proposed. Some asset buyers are informed in that they can identify high-quality assets. Heterogeneous sellers with private information choose what type of buyers they want to trade with. When the measure of informed buyers is low, there exists a unique...

We study a two-period perfectly competitive industry where firms are run by agents privately informed about their (persistent) costs, and principals can only use spot contracts. The interplay between payoff externalities and spot contracting has novel implications for industry dynamics. With...

When partnerships come to an end, partners must find a way to efficiently reallocate the commonly owned assets to those who value them the most. This requires that the aforementioned members possess enough financial resources to buy out the others’ shares. I investigate ex post efficient...

The theoretical approach in dealing with the aggregation of information in markets in general, and financial markets in particular considers information as an exogenous element to the system, focusing just on conditions and consequences of the efficient incorporation of information into prices....

We provide a new framework for using text as data in empirical models. The framework identifies salient information in unstructured text that can control for multidimensional heterogeneity among assets. We demonstrate the efficacy of the framework by re-examining principal-agent problems in...

This study investigates the impact of delegation structure of the top management team upon the quality of corporate voluntary disclosure on financial outcomes. The paper develops two competing hypotheses pertaining to the functional relationship between the degree of delegation and the...

Many financial arrangements reference market prices that are yet to be realized at the time of contracting and consequently susceptible to manipulation. Two of the most common such arrangements are: (i) market-on-close contracts, which reference the price prevailing at the end of an execution...

Contrary to the prediction of the classic adverse selection theory, a more informed trader could receive better pricing relative to a less informed trader in over‑the‑counter financial markets. Dealers chase informed orders to better position their future quotes and avoid winner’s curse in...