The relationship between exorbitant chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and weak performance has been widely criticised as an abuse of managerial power and the intrusion of agency problems. This study examines whether the agency problem of free cash flow (FCF), identified by Jensen...

We analyze the determinants of the compensation of private college and university presidents from 1999 through 2007. We find that the fraction of institutional revenue derived from current donations is negatively associated with compensation and that presidents of religiously-affiliated...

We take advantage of a 2017 change in tax rules in the U.S. to re-examine whether CEOs are rewarded for luck. We examine the effect of one-off tax gains and losses associated with deferred tax assets and liabilities on CEO compensation around the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017. Relative to...

This study examines the relationship between cross-listing and managerial compensation of Chinese firms that concurrently issued A- and B-shares or A- and H-shares during 2001 - 2010. The results show that executive compensation is a positive factor to motivate Chinese A-share firms to...

Wir analysieren das Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung. Ferner arbeiten wir einige aufgrund wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Überlegungen zu erwartende Probleme heraus und prognostizieren mögliche ökonomische Auswirkungen des Gesetzes. Des Weiteren gehen wir im Rahmen einer...

This Article reports results of an empirical study that suggests that the current economic crisis has changed managerial behavior in the US in a way that may impede economic recovery. The study finds a strong, statistically significant and economically meaningful, positive correlation between...

Morse, Nanda and Seru (2011) interpret the data to suggest that more powerful CEOs ex-post change their incentive contracts more. My paper points out a number of issues with their inference. First and most importantly, MNS do not control for the fact that not just the most powerful but almost...

This study investigates the relation between the use of explicit employment agreements (EA) and CEO compensation. Overall, our findings are broadly consistent with the predictions of Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) that an EA is used to induce CEOs to make firm-specific human capital...

The classic question in corporate governance is how to manage the conflicts-of-interest that arise from fundamental principal-agent problems. One of the most popular methods of solving the problem is by separating ownership and management. Since 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has set new standards...

In this article, we analyze whether the manipulation of stock options still continues to this day. Our evidence shows that executives continue to employ a variety of manipulative devices to increase their compensation, including backdating, bullet-dodging, and spring- loading. Overall, we find...