In this paper, we show that behavioral features can be obtained at a group level when the individuals of the group are heterogeneous enough. Starting from a standard model of Pareto optimal allocations, with expected utility maximizers and exponential discounting, but allowing for heterogeneity...

Consider a firm owned by shareholders with heterogeneous beliefs and run by a manager. Shareholders can trade contingent claims in a complete asset market. The manager is given a contract so that at equilibrium she chooses the plan preferred by shareholders. We show that the contract should...

In this paper, we show that behavioral features can be obtained at a group level when the individuals of the group are heterogeneous enough. Starting from a standard model of Pareto optimal allocations, with expected utility maximizers and exponential discounting, but allowing for heterogeneity...

We study incentive contracts in asset management business under dynamic actions and relationships between an investor, a partner of an investment company, and a fund manager of the company. The investor cannot perfectly observe the partner and manager’s actions, and similarly, the partner...

We investigate the optimal regulation of energy production reflecting the long-term goals of the Paris Climate Agreement.We analyze the optimal regulatory incentives to foster the development of non-emissive electricity generation when the demand for power is served either by a monopoly or by...

We investigate the optimal regulation of energy production reflecting the long-term goals of the Paris Climate Agreement. We analyze the optimal regulatory incentives to foster the development of non-emissive electricity generation when the demand for power is served either by a monopoly or by...