We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor...

In a model of career concerns for experts, when is the principal hurt from observing more information about her agent? This paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent's action and information directly on the agent's action. It is the latter kind that can...

We identify and investigate the basic 'hold-up problem' which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a 'contractual solution' to this hold-up problem is not available....

Auf dem Mediamarkt wird Werbeträgerleistung (Anzeigen, Werbespots usw.) gehandelt. Meist beraten Werbeagenturen die werbungtreibenden Unternehmen bei Auswahl und Einsatz der Werbeträgerleistung sowie bei der Abwicklung der an die Medienunternehmen erteilten Schaltaufträge. Die Arbeit...

Long and specific Contracts in the US and short and ambiguous contracts in Japan are a stereotypical comparison of the contracting practices in both countries. Such characteristics of written contracts are understood as sticky. Based on a semi-structured interview of Japanese auto and...