We analyze the Moral Hazard problem, assuming that agents are inequity averse. Our results differ from conventional contract theory and are more in line with empirical findings than standard results. We find: First, inequity aversion alters the structure of optimal contracts. Second, there is a...

We consider the mechanism design problem when agents' types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule there exist balanced transfers that render...

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated...

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated...

We find that social capital, as captured by secular norms and networks surrounding corporate headquarters, is negatively associated with total and equity-based CEO compensation. This relation is robust in tests for omitted variables, in instrumental-variable regressions, and in regressions using...

Awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies and republics, private organizations, not-for-profit and profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, economists have disregarded this kind of non-material extrinsic incentive. The demand for awards relies on an...

Principals can attempt to get agents to perform certain actions preferable to the principal by using ex-post punishments or rewards to align incentives. Field data is mixed on whether, and to what extent, such informal incentive contracting crowds out efficient solutions to the agency problem....

Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept---robust equilibrium---that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching markets operated by the applicant-proposing Deferred...

This paper considers a firm whose potential employees have private information on both their productivity and the extent of their fairness concerns. Fairness is modelled as inequity aversion, where fair-minded workers suffer if their colleagues get more income net of production costs. Screening...

This paper considers a firm whose potential employees have private information on both their productivity and the extent of their fairness concerns. Fairness is modelled as inequity aversion, where fair-minded workers suffer if their colleagues get more income net of production costs. Screening...