The paper introduces the problem of unawareness into Principal-Agent theory and discusses optimal incentive contracts when the agent may be unaware of her action space. Depending on the agent's default behavior, it can be optimal for the principal to propose an incomplete contract (that keeps...

The paper introduces the problem of unawareness into multi-dimensional Principal-Agent theory. We introduce two key parameters to describe the problem, the extent and the e ffect of unawareness, show under what conditions it is optimal for the Principal to propose an incomplete or a complete...

Contract law treats consumer attention as if it were unlimited. We instead view consumer attention as a scarce resource that must be conserved. We argue that consumer contracts generate negative externalities by overwhelming consumers with information that depletes their attention and prevents...

We consider a model in which a principal may delegate the choice of a project to a better informed agent. The preferences of the agent and the principal about which project should be undertaken may be discordant. Moreover, the agent benefits from being granted more discretion in the project...

We study the interaction between productive investment and persuasion activities in a principal-agent setting with strategic disclosure. In an attempt to persuade the principal, the agent diverts substantial resources from productive activities to information acquisition for persuasion, even...

This paper investigates the use of self-funded commitment contracts to support individuals in achieving their goals of increased physical activity. We compare the effect of soft (non-incentivised) commitment contracts with hard (incentivised) contracts using a randomised experiment with 1629...

We conduct a real-effort experiment to test whether workers reciprocate generous wages by managers when workers are tempted to surf the internet. Further, we investigate how an active policy of restricting the usage of the internet affects the workers' motivation. We observe that the temptation...

We study a two-stage agency model in which the players take the role of the principal in turn. In the first stage, the board of the firm decides payment to the manager to induce him to set up and implement a project. In the second stage, the board evaluates the project to learn its value, and...

We study the informed-principal problem in a bilateral asymmetric information trading setting with interdependent values and quasi-linear utilities. The informed seller proposes a mechanism and voluntarily certifies information about the good's characteristics. When the set of certifiable...

We consider a principal-agent model, where a single agent exhibits problems of self control modelled using Gul, Pesendorfer (2001) type temptation preferences. For a general class of preferences, yet specific family of temptation utilities, we characterize an optimal contract in such a setting...