This paper examines the effects of the pyramid inner ownership structure of companies on capital structure in an emerging market economy country. The author uses firm-level panel data of Chinese listed companies to analyze the effects of the inner structure of pyramid on capital structure, and...

This paper is the third chapter of the third edition of The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, by Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda Mariana Pargendler, Georg Ringe, and Edward Rock...

Does the structure of corporate boards affect bondholder agency risk? Using mandatory board reforms, I show that firms that transition to independent boards experience economically significant reductions in payout, financing, and event risk covenants in their bond contracts. This effect is not...

This paper explores the relationship between creditor rights and employee rights and capital structure across countries. Using country-level creditor rights index and labor rights index as a proxy for agency costs of creditors and agency costs of employees, respectively, I address the agency...

This study empirically investigates the association between board attributes and capital structure decisions of non-financial listed firms in Bangladesh. This study also investigates how this association is shaped and moderated by the level of insider ownership. The current study takes 3096...

We use a dynamic model of financing decisions to measure agency conflicts for a large panel of 12,652 firms from 14 countries. Our estimates show that agency conflicts are large and vary significantly across firms and countries. Differences in agency conflicts are largely due to differences in...

We study the financial determinants of cash holdings and discuss the importance of firm size in the post-crisis period. We employ panel data regression analysis on a sample of 6629 non-financial and non-utility listed companies in the United Kingdom from 2010 to 2018. We focus on the comparative...

During times of distress, companies are compelled to reassess operational policies and reengineer strategic formulations to discern value maximising uses for limited resources. The executive’s agility to react to financial distress determines the probability of bankruptcy. Proper governance...

The classic question in corporate governance is how to manage the conflicts-of-interest that arise from fundamental principal-agent problems. One of the most popular methods of solving the problem is by separating ownership and management. Since 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has set new standards...