We analyze the determinants of covenant structure in private debt contracts. While previous studies have demonstrated a relationship between firm characteristics and the overall strictness of loan contracts, few studies have examined why covenants are written on a range of accounting variables...

Private debt contracts tend to have covenants that restrict future investment, restrict capital structure decisions, or impose thresholds for cash flows or other performance measures. While previous studies have demonstrated a relationship between firm characteristics and the overall strictness...

Many markets, including markets for IPOs and debt issuances, are syndicated: each winning bidder invites competitors to join its syndicate to complete production. Using repeated extensive form games, we show that collusion in syndicated markets may become easier as market concentration falls,...

We use machine learning to analyze minute-by-minute Bloomberg online status data and study how the effort provision of top executives in public corporations affects firm value. While executives likely spend most of their time doing other activities, Bloomberg usage data allows us to characterize...

When self-interested agents compete for scarce resources, they often exaggerate the promise of their activities. As such, principals must consider both the quality of each opportunity and each agent's credibility. We show that principals are better off with less transparency because they gain...