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Lehmann, Erik - 2018 - Version , November 19th 2018

interdisciplinary concept encompassing academic fields like finance, economics, accounting, law, taxation and psychology, among others …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011928257

The new institutional economics - main theories

Obińska-Wajda, Emilia - In: E-Finanse : finansowy kwartalnik internetowy 12 (2016) 1, pp. 78-85

The aim of this arti cle is to show that the New Insti tuti onal Economics is an interdisciplinary stream combining … economics, law, organizati on theory, politi cal sciences, sociology, and anthropology. The main theories which are part of the … New Insti tuti onal Economics are: Agency Theory, Property Rights Theory and Transaction Costs Theory. The basic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539833

A Legal Basis for Workers as Agents : Employment Contracts, Common Law, and the Theory of the Firm

James, Jr., Harvey S. - 2004

: employment contracts, managerial control, agency relations, common law, transaction cost economics …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014122294

Theories of the (state-owned) firm

Peng, Mike W.; Bruton, Garry D.; Stan, Ciprian V.; … - In: Asia Pacific journal of management : APJM ; a … 33 (2016) 2, pp. 239-317

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011583792

Haggling for rents, relational contracts, and the theory of the firm

Gürtler, Oliver - 2006

In this paper, a formal rent-seeking theory of the firm is developed. The main idea is that integration (compared to non-integration) facilitates rent-seeking for the integrating party, but makes it harder for the integrated one. In a one-period model, this implies that the rent-seeking contest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383041

Haggling for Rents, Relational Contracts, and the Theory of the Firm

Gürtler, Oliver - 2010

I analyze how ownership can be structured to minimize the haggling costs due to contractual incompleteness. I model haggling as a contest in which integration gives the integrating party a relative advantage over the integrated party. In a one-period model, this implies that the contest will...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014188796

Use and abuse of authority : a behavioral foundation of the employment relation

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720579

Use and abuse of authority : a behavioral foundation of the employment relation

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009685891

Externalities and the allocation of decision rights in the theory of the firm

Bester, Helmut - 2004 - Version 1.3, April 2004

This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that have external effects on other members of the organization. Because of contractual incompleteness, monetary incentives are insufficient to internalize these effects in the decision maker's objective. The optimal assignment of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366572

The Firm as an Intrinsic Motivation Device

Ramalingam, Abhijit - 2014

In this paper, we develop a new theory of the firm where the market is primarily an incentive system whereas the firm is an intrinsic motivation device. The firm is more efficient than the market when asset specificity and subjective risk are sufficiently high because it provides balanced...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012708799

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