Showing 1 - 10 of 996
We provide a preference-based rationale for endogenous overconfidence. Horizon-dependent risk aversion, combined with a … possibility to forget, can generate overconfidence and excessive risk taking in equilibrium. An "anxiety prone" agent, who is more … results to the literature on empirically observed overconfidence and excessive risk taking in several domains of financial and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010482950
We extend Akerlof's (1970) "Market for Lemons" by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is at display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes' rule but take the noisy signal at face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009375745
We extend Akerlof (1970)'s 'Market for Lemons' by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is on display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes' rule but take the noisy signal at face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342215
A long-standing puzzle is how overconfidence can persist in settings characterized by repeated feedback. This paper …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014311540
If the future market wage is uncertain, engaging in long–term employment is risky, with the risk depending on how regulated the labor market is. In our experiment long–term employment can result either from offering long–term contracts or from repeatedly and mutually opting for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003906133
Facing a stochastic market wage, which is independent of their own hiring policy, employers offer contracts specifying fixed wage, revenue share and employment duration. In ongoing employment relations it depends on the treatment whether fixed wages can be only increased or also decreased. Will...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014223201
In this paper, I study the effects of overconfidence on incentive contracts in a moral-hazard framework in which … overconfidence can have conflicting effects on the equilibrium contract. On the one hand, an overconfident agent disproportionately …; because the agent bears less risk in this case, he actually benefits from his overconfidence. If the agent is significantly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217614
Information asymmetry has been a critical issue in management accounting. Non-co-linearity of interests among market participants brings forth this problem. As a decision making tool, firms should leverage out the benefits of management accounting system to encounter this problem, as it has a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014163109
In this paper, I study the effects of overconfidence on incentive contracts in a moral-hazard framework in which … overconfidence can have conflicting effects on the equilibrium contract. On the one hand, an overconfident agent disproportionately …; because the agent bears less risk in this case, he actually benefits from his overconfidence. If the agent is significantly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051500
We examine the case of a firm holding the option to make an uncertain and irreversible investment. The firm is decentralized and there is information asymmetry between the owner and the investment manager regarding the price of an input (e.g. a key equipment) that needs to be purchased by an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932000