To date, much of the literature on institutional economics has relied on abstract metaphors based in exchange. Thus, Williamson introduced the fundamental insights surrounding his “transaction costs” model and discussed the governance of contracts in exchange relationships. Yet organizations...

Many markets, including markets for IPOs and debt issuances, are syndicated: each winning bidder invites competitors to join its syndicate to complete production. Using repeated extensive form games, we show that collusion in syndicated markets may become easier as market concentration falls,...

We study physician agency and optimal payment policy in the context of an expensive medication used in dialysis care. Using Medicare claims data we estimate a structural model of treatment decisions, in which physicians differ in their altruism and marginal costs, and this heterogeneity is...

How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551 thousand nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second,...

In a paper published by Ma (1994) it was argued that the prospective payment system in the hospital industry was superior to the cost based reimbursement system to achieve both cost reduction and quality improvement objectives. In the analysis, it was assumed that quality and costs decisions...

Small and medium enterprises, or referred to herein as “SME,” may face possible extinction when falling behind the fierce competition in the marketplaces. Undoubtedly, SMEs business viability is the big question mark. Given the limited current capabilities, SMEs may face substantial hurdles...

I study the role of unilateral strategic contracts for firms active in markets with price competition and endogenous entry. Traditional results change substantially when the market structure is endogenous rather than exogenous. They concern 1) contracts of managerial delegation to non-profit...

This paper opens up the "black box" of firms' profit functions to consider the affect of modelling firms as principal-agent relationships on the outcomes of strategic competition. Using a parameterised model it is found that for large market sizes moral hazard reduces expected output more...

Companies employ managers for either practical, legal or administrative reasons. However, no matter what the reason, the good performance of managers and the success of companies are vital elements for firms. At this point, managerial incentives play a key role. In this paper, we use the VFJS...

Antitrust courts have shortchanged the economic analysis of buyer-side market power in health care. This failure derives to a surprising degree from a single judicial decision, then-Judge Stephen Breyer's 1984 opinion for the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Kartell v. Blue Shield of...